Latest Strategic guidance on Building decontamination for CBRN

The guidance is part of sensible contingency and business continuity planning and does not mean that there is an increased risk of terrorist attack using CBRN materials. It gives basic information on the decontamination and remediation that may be required following a deliberate or accidental release in the UK as outlined below. 
This document replaces guidance published in 2004 by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, and the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (now the Department for Communities and Local Government).

Evacuate or Shelter in place?

Taking Decisions about Evacuation during a Chemical Incident

From a Business Continuity or Emergency Planning perspective is it better to evacuate people in the vicinity of a serious chemical fire or should they remain where they are?

A study* comparing the health outcomes in sheltered and evacuated populations after a chemical fire suggests that there are health advantages in people sheltering rather than evacuating. The study is published in the BMJ and was based on a real incident in 1999. It involved collaboration between public health staff at a local health authority and national health experts (now at Bristol University and the Health Protection Agency).

Poison plotter convicted

A man has been convicted of plotting to manufacture homemade poisons and explosives with the intention of causing fear and injury to those who come into contact with them.

The conviction of Kamel Bourgass follows a long and intensive investigation by detectives from the Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorist Branch with assistance from the security service and other police forces. During a search of premises in Wood Green, London on 5th January 2003 detectives discovered residue from a homemade poison, together with recipes and instructions for making poisons and explosives.

Decontamination following a CBR Event

ARCHIVE Material

The planning for business continuity and disaster recovery post CBR chemical biological radiological is often ignored or even potentially worse, incorrectly assessed. This assessment can be assimilated as that of a hazard assessment when the risk manager doesn’t know of combined or symbiotic effects. Post CBR planning may be difficult to assess due to limited knowledge, experience or facts but various information is available on which to assert assumptions.

This article attempts to alert the planner to some elements that should be considered.

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